ASCON is an authenticated encryption algorithm which is recently qualified for the second-round of the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness. So far, successful differential, differential-linear, and cube-like attacks on the reduced-round ASCON are provided. In this work, we provide the inverse of ASCON's linear layer in terms of rotations which can be used for constructing impossible differentials. We show that ASCON's S-box contains 35 undisturbed bits and we use them to construct 4 and 5-round truncated, impossible, and improbable differential distinguishers. Our results include practical 4-round truncated, impossible, and improbable differential attacks on ASCON. Our best attacks using these techniques break 5 out of 12 rounds. These are the first successful truncated, impossible, and improbable differential attacks on the reduced-round ASCON.
INTRODUCTION
The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) is an ongoing cryptographic competition where authenticated encryption schemes are challenging. The first round of the competition had 56 ciphers and recently on 07.07.2015 it was announced that 29 of them qualified for the second round. It is expected that the third round candidates will be announced around June 2016 and a final portfolio will be announced at the end of 2017. However, these dates are tentative because cryptanalysis effort required to analyze candidates is unpredictable.
ASCON (Dobraunig et al., 2014 ) is one of the authenticated encryption schemes that made it to the second round of the CAESAR competition. Until now, this cipher is successfully analyzed against differential, differential-linear, and cube-like attacks. Currently the best key recovery attack on this scheme breaks 6 out of 12 rounds and the best forgery attack is on 4 rounds. Although the designers analyze ASCON for impossible differential attacks, they only achieve a 5-round impossible differential for the permutation. It can be used to distinguish the ASCON permutation from a random permutation but it cannot be used directly in a key recovery or forgery attack.
In this work, we first analyze ASCON's S-box and provide its undisturbed bits which can be used to construct longer truncated, impossible, or improbable differentials. Then we analyze ASCON's linear layer. We prove that its invertible and provide its inverse in terms of XOR of rotations of binary words. Then we analyze the security of ASCON against truncated, impossible, and improbable differential cryptanalysis and provide the first attacks which use these techniques. We provide truncated differential key recovery attacks on 4 and 5 rounds, impossible differential attacks on 4 rounds, and improbable differential attacks on 5 rounds of ASCON. Moreover, we provide 5 round truncated, impossible, and improbable differential distinguishers which requires much less data when compared to the impossible differential distinguisher of the designers.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we describe ASCON and summarize the previous cryptanalysis results on this cipher. In Sect. 3, we analyze ASCON's S-box and provide its undisturbed bits. In Sect. 4, we prove that the linear layer of ASCON is invertible and provide its inverse in terms of rotations. In Sect. 5, we provide the first truncated, impossible, and improbable differential key recovery attacks on ASCON. We conclude our paper in Sect. 6.
ASCON 2.1 Design
ASCON is an authenticated encryption scheme that is submitted to ongoing CAESAR competition and it qualified for the second-round. It is a substitutionpermutation network and it is based on a sponge-like construction with a state size of 320 bits. ASCON's mode of operation is based on MonkeyDuplex (Daemen, 2012) .
The initial design of ASCON, which is referred to as v1.0, supported two key lengths, 96 and 128 bits. However, the designers removed the 96-bit key support when tweaking for the second-round of the competition. Since 80-bit security is not suggested today, removing the 96-bit key variant is probably a good call since it may not be secure in the close future. The tweaked ASCON is referred to as v1.1 and we focus on this latest version in this paper. The tweaked version provides two recommended parameter sets referred to as ASCON-128 and ASCON-128a.
The encryption consists of four steps: Initialization, processing associated data, processing the plaintext, and finalization. The 320-bit state is represented with five 64-bit words x 0 , . . . , x 4 . The scheme uses two permutations p a and p b which applies the round transformation p iteratively a and b times. These steps are illustrated in Figure 1 .
For ASCON-128, we have a = 12 and b = 6. For ASCON-128a we have a = 12 and b = 8. Both versions use 128-bit key, nonce and tag. However, data block size is 64 for ASCON-128 and 128 for ASCON128a.
The round transformation of ASCON first adds a constant to x 2 , applies a nonlinear substitution layer and then applies a linear layer. The substitution layer applies a 5-bit S-box 64 times in parallel. This S-box is affine equivalent to the Keccak (Bertoni et al., 2011) χ mapping and is provided in Table 1 . The linear layer is actually XOR of right rotations of the 64-bit words x 0 , . . . , x 4 . The linear layer can be described as follows:
Security
We can divide the attacks into two categories, forgery and key recovery. Forgery attacks focus on the finalization and key recovery attacks focus on the initialization phases of ASCON. When analysing AS-CON, we can target either the initialization in a noncerespecting scenario, or the processing of the plaintext in a nonce-misuse scenario.
In case of an attack on the finalization of AS-CON, suitable characteristics may contain differences in stateword x 0 at the input of the permutation. The rest of the statewords have to be free of differences. For the output of the finalization, the only requirement is that there is some fixed difference pattern in x 3 and x 4 . Knowledge about the expected differences in x 0 , x 1 , and x 2 at the output of the permutation is not required. When we focus on the initialization, differences are allowed in the nonce x 3 , x 4 and the output is observed only for x 0 (i.e. output difference should be at x 0 ).
The first analysis of ASCON is done by the designers in the CAESAR competition submission document (Dobraunig et al., 2014) . They provided collision-producing differentials and 5-round impossible differential for the permutation. In (Dobraunig et al., 2015) , these observations are further improved to obtain 6-round cube-like, 5-round differentiallinear key recovery attacks and 4-round differential forgery attack. They also provided linear and differential bounds and 12-round zero-sum distinguishers for the permutation that requires 2 130 time complexity.
Moreover, Todo provided integral distinguishers for various numbers of rounds for the ASCON permutation (Todo, 2015) .
Finally, Jovanovic et al. proved that ASCON's sponge mode is secure even for higher rates (Jovanovic et al., 2014) .
ANALYSIS OF ASCON'S S-BOX
ASCON designers provide differential and linear properties of ASCON's S-box in (Dobraunig et al., 2014) . The maximum differential probability of the S-box is 2 −2 and its differential branch number is 3. The maximum linear probability of the S-box is 2 −2 and its linear branch number is 3. The algebraic degree of the S-box is 2. A different 5 × 5 S-box with smaller maximum differential probability and linear probability could easily be chosen by the designers. However, this S-box was intentionally chosen because it requires very small area in hardware and performs very fast in software and hardware.
Definition 3.1. (Tezcan, 2014) For a specific input difference of an S-box, if some bits of the output difference remain invariant, then we call such bits undisturbed. (Evertse, 1987) An n × m S-Box S is said to have a linear structure if there exists a nonzero vector α ∈ F n 2 together with a nonzero vector b ∈ F m 2 such that b · S(x) ⊕ b · S(x ⊕ α) takes the same value c ∈ F 2 for all x ∈ F n 2 . We further analyzed this S-box for other cryptographic properties and observed that it has 91 linear structures. 35 of them corresponds to coordinate functions, thus by (Makarim and Tezcan, 2014) they are undisturbed bits in the forward direction and they are provided in Table 2 . Moreover, ASCON has 2 undisturbed bits for the inverse S-box, namely 00010 →???1? and 01000 →?1???. Although the inverse S-box is not used in the encryption or decryption process, its undisturbed bits can be used when constructing impossible differentials via the miss-inthe-middle technique.
Definition 3.3. (Tezcan andÖzbudak, 2014 ) Let S be a function from F n 2 to F m 2 . For all x, y ∈ F n 2 that satisfy S(x) ⊕ S(y) = µ, if we also have S(x ⊕ λ) ⊕ S(y ⊕ λ) = µ, then we say that S has a differential factor λ for the output difference µ. (i.e. µ remains invariant for λ).
Recently, a new S-box property called differential factor is introduced in (Tezcan andÖzbudak, 2014) which shows that some key bits may not be captured in a differential attack or its variants. This observation may be used to reduce the time complexity of the key guess step of differential attacks. On the other hand, it increases the time complexity of exhaustive search for the remaining key bits phase. Differential factors are used in (Tezcan andÖzbudak, 2014) to reduce the time complexity of differential-linear attacks on SER-PENT (Biham et al., 1998) . Although ASCON's S-box does not have the best cryptographic properties, surprisingly it does not contain any differential factors. 
ANALYSIS OF ASCON'S LINEAR LAYER
The inverse of ASCON's linear layer is not provided in (Dobraunig et al., 2014) because ASCON is a sponge construction and the inverse of this layer is not required in the decryption process. However, in order to obtain impossible differential distinguishers using the miss-in-the-middle technique, we need the inverse permutation to check differentials in the reverse order. We will also use them as filtering conditions when we are choosing plaintext-ciphertext pairs in our truncated and improbable differential attacks.
The linear layer consists of XOR of right rotations of the 64-bit words x 0 , . . . , x 4 . Thus, the first thing to check whether such an operation is invertible or not. The following theorem shows when XOR of rotations of binary words are invertible.
Theorem 4.1. (Rivest, 2011) If n is a power of 2, v is an n-bit word, and r 1 , r 2 , . . ., r k are distinct fixed integers modulo n, then the function
is invertible if and only if k is odd, where (v ≪ r) denotes the n-bit word v rotated left by r positions, and where '⊕' denotes the bit-wise 'exclusive-or' of n-bit words.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the linear layer of ASCON is invertible since k = 3 for all of the five transformations Σ 0 , . . . , Σ 4 . If we consider n-element vectors over the finite field F 2 , one can obtain R(v) by multiplying v by an n × n circulant matrix over F 2 having k ones per row and per column. Thus, inverse of R(v) can be obtained by finding the inverse of this circulant matrix via reducing it to row-reduced echelon form by means of row operations. This way we obtained the inverse of the linear layer and the right rotations required to perform the inverse linear layer is provided in Table 3 .
TRUNCATED, IMPOSSIBLE, AND IMPROBABLE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
Statistical attacks on block ciphers make use of a property of the cipher so that an event occurs with different probabilities depending on whether the correct key is used or not. We represent these probabilities with p 0 for the correct key and p for the wrong ones. For instance, differential cryptanalysis (Biham and Shamir, 1991) considers characteristics or differentials which show that a particular output difference should be obtained with a relatively high probability when a particular input difference is used. Hence, when the correct key is used, the predicted differences occur more frequently (i.e. p 0 > p). In a classical differential characteristic the differences are fully specified and in a truncated differential (Knudsen, 1994) only parts of the differences are specified. On the other hand, impossible differential cryptanalysis (Biham et al., 2005) uses an impossible differential which shows that a particular difference cannot occur for the correct key (i.e. probability of this event is exactly zero). Therefore, if these differences are satisfied under a trial key, then it cannot be the correct one (i.e. p 0 = 0). Thus, the correct key can (Tezcan, 2010) that it is also possible to obtain differentials so that the predicted differences occur less frequently for the correct key (i.e. p 0 < p). This new cryptanalytic technique is called the improbable differential attack and the impossible differential attack can be seen as a special case of it where p 0 = 0.
Truncated Differential Analysis

4-Round Truncated Differential Distinguisher
Undisturbed bits of ASCON's S-box allows us to obtain long truncated differentials. We first focus on probability 1 truncated differentials in order to convert them to impossible differentials via the miss-inthe-middle technique. The longest truncated differential we could find in the encryption direction with probability 1 is on 3.5-rounds of ASCON and it is provided in Table 4 . By adding the permutation layer to the end, this differential can be used to distinguish 4 rounds of the permutation with only 2 chosen nonces. 
4-Round Truncated Differential Attack
We cannot use our 3.5-round truncated differential ∆ 1 in a key recovery attack because we can only provide input differences at the words x 3 and x 4 . We observe that if we provide the input difference 3 x to a single S-box, then the output difference is 1 x with probability 2 −3 . Then with probability 1, we have 54 th Sbox with 0 x output difference at the end of substitution layer of round 4. After the permutation layer we focus on the word x 0 because this is the only word that we can work on in an attack to the initialization phase. Thus, output differences that have the difference 0 corresponding to the most significant bit of the 54 th after the application of the inverse permutation provided in Table 3 are the right pairs for our attack. Since half of the output differences make that bit have 0 difference, this filtering condition has probability 1/2. Details of this differential are provided in Table 5 . Since this is a probability 1 differential distinguisher, complementing the output differences provides a 4-round impossible differential distinguisher. For a wrong key, this differential holds with probability p = 1/2. However, it holds with probability p 0 = 1 for the correct key. If we think ASCON as a block cipher where the plaintext is XORed with the key, then we can capture 2 bits of the key corresponding to the active S-box with 2 11 data complexity and negligible time and memory complexity. Due to the symmetry of the cipher, remaining key bits can be captured by applying the same attack with shifting the input difference. However, key is not XORed with the plaintext in ASCON and the S-box input difference 3 x gives the output difference 1 x when the corresponding two key bits are 1. Hence, this attack can be used with the symmetry of the cipher to check if the two key bits corresponding to the active S-boxes are 1. Approximately 16 of them would be 1 and thus the attack should work for them. And the remaining 48 of them can be found via exhaustive search which would require 3 48 4-round ASCON encryptions. 
5-Round Truncated Differential Attack
We can perform a 5-round attack on ASCON by giving 3 x input difference to 35 S-boxes and check if all of the output differences are 1 x . Thus, we need to guess 2 · 35 = 70 bits of the key. To the bottom of these differences, we add a 4-round truncated differential that holds with probability 2 −3 which is provided in Table  6 . For a wrong key, this differential holds with probability p = 1/2. However, it holds with probability p 0 = 1/2 + 1/8 for the correct key. If ASCON were a block cipher where the plaintext is XORed with the key, then we could perform a key recovery attack where knowledge of 2 110 data would be enough to distinguish 70 bits of the key from the wrong ones and around 2 101 5-round AS-CON encryptions would be required. However, key is not XORed with the plaintext in ASCON and the Sbox input difference 3 x gives the output difference 1 x when the corresponding two key bits are 1. So the attack works when the key bits corresponding to the 35 active S-boxes are all 1. So the attack works for a weak key space of size 2 128−2·35 = 2 58 . The weak key space becomes around 2 64 when we use the symmetry of the cipher but it is still very small compared to 2 128 . Therefore, if the attacked key is in the weak key space, then we capture its 70 bits with negligible time complexity and recover the remaining bits with exhaustive search that requires 2 58 5-round ASCON encryptions. However, if the key is not in this weak key space, then the attack only becomes slightly faster than the exhaustive search, namely 2 128 − 2 64 5-round ASCON encryptions.
Note that the whole differential provided in Table  6 can be seen as a 5-round truncated differential distinguisher with probability 2 −107 . Hence, we can use it with 2 109 data to distinguish the 5-round ASCON from a random permutation. Complementing the output differences provides a 5-round improbable differential distinguisher that works similar to this 5-round truncated differential.
Impossible Differentials
ASCON's security against impossible differential attacks is discussed in (Dobraunig et al., 2014) by the designers and they obtained a 5-round impossible differential via computer search. This differential can be used to distinguish the permutation p and it is provided in Table 7 . However, for a random permutation this impossible differential holds with probability p = 2 −320 . Thus, one needs to use the whole codebook to use it as a distinguisher. Moreover, since the output differences are fully specified, it cannot be used in a key recovery or forgery attack.
We consider truncated differentials in the decryption direction to obtain impossible differentials by combining them with our 3.5-round truncated differential ∆ 1 . We cannot find such long truncated differ- Table 7 : Impossible differential of (Dobraunig et al., 2014) that covers 5 rounds of p in hexadecimal notation. It holds with probability p = 2 −320 for a random permutation.
Input difference
Output Difference x 0 0000000000000000 0000000000100000 x 1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 x 2 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 x 3 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 x 4 8000000000000000 0000000000000000 entials in the decryption direction because a single bit difference to the permutation provides differences at more than 30 bits because of the inverse linear transformations. Moreover, the inverse of ASCON's S-box has only two undisturbed bits. The longest truncated differentials we could find covers 1.5 rounds in the decryption direction. Thus, we can use them to obtain 5-round impossible differentials using the missin-the-middle technique. An example of such an impossible differential is provided in Table 8 . The differences are fully specified in this impossible differential, too. However, note that since the contradiction is obtained at a single bit, half of the differences given only to x 3 or x 1 at P5 still make it miss in the middle due to the undisturbed bits. Since we can give 2 63 different differences to the x 3 or x 1 , we have p = 2 −256 for this bundle of impossible differentials instead of p = 2 −320 . Table 8 : An impossible differential that covers 5 rounds of p in binary notation. Substitution and permutation layers are denoted by S and P, respectively. The miss-in-the-middle is obtained by combining the 3.5-round ∆ 1 in the forward direction with the 1.5-round differential in the backward direction that is provided below. 
CONCLUSIONS
ASCON's S-box contains many undisturbed bits and in this study we used them to construct truncated, impossible, and improbable differentials. We provide the results of our distinguishers in Table 9 . Our best attacks break 5 out of 12 rounds of ASCON and they are provided in Table 10 . These attacks can be prevented by replacing ASCON's S-box with a cryptographically more secure one. However, ASCON's Sbox is deliberately chosen this way mainly because of its bit-sliced implementation with few, well pipelined instructions. Our attacks show that further analysis may provide truncated, impossible or improbable differential distinguishers or attacks on 6 or more rounds of AS-CON. However, the full scheme looks resistant to these type of attacks. Thus, we conclude that the security/performance trade-off due to the choice of the S-box is well justified and the full cipher is secure against truncated, impossible, and improbable differential attacks. However, our analysis and differentials can be used to obtain better attacks when combined with other cryptanalysis techniques.
